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Abstract 
As increasing in number of Android phones there is simultaneous increase in mobile malware apps which performs 
malicious activities such as misusing user’s private information as sending messages i.e. SMS, reading users contact 
information and can harm user by exploiting the user’s confidential data which is stored in mobile. Malware are 
speeded not only infecting the user’s data but also harming several organizations in term of stealing of private and 
confidential data. Hence Malware classification and identification is a critical issue. Android users are unaware 
about several apps which they are using whether they are malware infected or not. Android applications require the 
concept of permission mechanism to show that apps are using certain permissions to get access to information from 
your device. Android apps which are installed in the smart phones get access to all the required permission during 
installation of apps. Google assure their customer in terms of security about the apps which are available to 
download from there play store. Android operating system is open system and it allows users to install any 
applications downloaded from any unsafe site. However permission mechanism is still very diminutive defense 
mechanism to assure that the applications can harm to user. Therefore in this paper we propose the Malware 
characterization from manifest file and allows user to improve the efficiency of Android permission to inform user 
about the risk of Android permission and apps. 
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Introduction  
As increase in development of internet, the mobile internet is need of hour. As with the popularity and the fast 
development of Android OS, the security of Android OS is major challenge. As Android is  very popular mobile OS 
hence its demand is increasing day by day with the increase  in the challenge to safeguard an apps installed on users 
device which is connected to world of internet most of the time. These devices are more prone to the attack by the 
apps installed on their device called as malware. Report says that Android OS is first choice for the malicious 
software designers to attack Android OS. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the Android apps properly 
and using static and dynamic analysis methods to show the behavior of apps leaking users private information.  
Privacy leakage in this paper means the stealing of user’s confidential information by getting the unauthorized 
access to resources during installation such as Device ID, contacts, call records, location information etc. and send 
these information through messages or network. As if now the methods of finding users data privacy and leakage of 
information in Smartphone has mainly two types, static and dynamic. Static analysis means to focus on control flow, 
data flow and structural analysis [3]. As Androids major part is written in java programming language which has 
large number of function calls static analysis is not as effective as dynamic. As compared to static, dynamic analysis 
is concerned about sandboxing and dynamic taint tracking method. Sandboxing is the way of isolating android OS. 
Some background researches on Android security are mentioned as follows:  
 
1. Kui Luo proposed a byte code converter, converting DVM code into Java [6].  
2. Leonid Batyuk projected a method by decompiling sample applications not touching the core function, 
Although International Journal of Network Security, Vol.18, No.1, PP.182-192, Jan. 2016 183 this method 
can analyze the sample malware code effectively, it is unsatisfactory when the target program has been 
obfuscated.  
3. Enck implemented a Dalvik decompiler, DED, by using the static analysis package tool. The tool use 
Fortify SCA to analyze the application's control flow, dataflow, structure and semantics [7]. 
4. Qian et al also depends on Dalvik decompiling and gives a basic two-step framework for Android malware 
behavior monitoring [8].  
5. ComDroid analyzes the DEX byte code disassembled by Dedexer, and checks the Intent creation and 
transmission to identify the program broadcast hijacking vulnerabilities [9].  
6. ScanDroid extracts the security specification from configuration files of Android application and checks 
the consistency between the application dataflow and the specification [10]. ScanDroid is based on the 
WALA analysis framework, can only evaluate the open source applications. 
1.1. Android basic Architecture 
Android operating system is designed on basis of Linux kernel and is developed by the Google [4]. Android has a 
layered architecture, including the Linux kernel layer, middle layer and application layer, which can provide 
consistent services for the upper layer, masks the differences of the current layer and lower layer [5]. The middle 
layer of android performs center functions which can be implemented by programming languages like 
JAVA/C/C++. Most of the applications running on Android are written in Java programming language, and then 
these multiple java class files are converted to dex format by the Android dextojar tool. Each Android application is 
an independent instance to run in DVM, and has a unique identification number known as PID. Figure 1 gives brief 
information about architecture of an Android operating system. Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) [4] is the main 
component of Android platform as compared to other components of the Android. It fully supports all Java 
applications which are converted to dex (Dalvik Executable) format. The dex format is compressed format of Dalvik 
executable code, which is suitable for memory and processor speed. Dalvik code is accountable for process 
segregation and thread management. Each Android application corresponds to a separate instance of Dalvik virtual 
machine, and can be executed in virtual machine. 
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Fig. 1 Android Architecture 
1.2. Android  security issue 
Android security model is similar to Linux as it is designed on Linux kernel [4]. The main part of Android security 
model mainly includes the sandbox, application signature and permission mechanism. The permission mechanism 
limits applications to access user's private data (i.e. telephone numbers, contacts etc.), resources (i.e. log files) and 
system interface (i.e. Internet, GPS etc.). In permission mechanism, the phone's resources are organized by different 
categories, and each category corresponds to one kind of accessed resource.  
 
If an application requires access to certain resources, it needs to have the corresponding permissions. Although this 
mechanism is simple, it also has some defects that cannot protect the user's private information adequately. Some 
researchers, Ontang et al questioned Android security model, and pointed out that the current Android permissions 
model cannot meet certain security requirements. Enck proposed Kirin [10], a detection tool, to enhance existing 
Android permissions model.  
 
Based on a set of policy, Kirin has used to determine whether to grant the requested permissions to applications and 
through the analysis of the Android application's Manifest file to ensure the granted permission in accordance with 
system strategy. Android permissions mechanism is coarse-grained [4].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2. APK conversion steps 
 
The application required permissions must be granted all before installed and cannot be changed after installation. 
This permission model leads to certain potential security threats. On the one hand, permissions to access private data 
will be decided by users. For those non-security awareness users, the permission granting process is casual and 
blind. During the installation phase, if the program obtains permissions to access privacy information, then can be 
arbitrary abuse of user’s privacy and sensitive data at any time. On the other hand, the mechanism cannot effectively 
prevent permission escalation attacks. Applications can take advantage of a combination of permissions to steal the 
user's sensitive data. In order to reveal Android apps leaking user privacy information behavior, according to the 
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Android OS security mechanism, this paper proposed a malicious behavior analysis model combining the dynamic 
and static method, which will be discussed in detail in the next sections. 
2. Android Applications Malicious Behavior Analysis 
2.1. Analyzing Behaviors of Android apps 
Different methods for doing malware analysis are: static and dynamic approach. Static analysis is based on 
program's source code. It has maximum advantage of exposure and it helps to analyze the source code broadly. 
However static method is based on source code. And if we cannot get the target source code, through decompiling 
or reverse engineering, it is hard to analyze the program accurately, especially in the occasion that the target 
program has been malicious File.  
Dynamic analysis points to the exploration of run-time performance by running the program. This type of method is 
precise for finding the actual malicious code behavior. Meanwhile, the dynamic method has its own disadvantages 
because of its inadequate execution exposure, that is to say we cannot guarantee all of the running paths have been 
trigged during the test. In this paper, we present a combination of static and dynamic security analysis model that 
can make up for their shortcomings with each other, performs the analysis of malicious performance more widely 
and correctly. Fig. 2 explains the whole steps. Before analyzing the Android application, APK (android application 
package) needs to be decompiled to get the corresponding configuration and Smali [11] files. Among them, the 
configuration file with the format of AndroidManifest.xml is mainly used for permissions filtering stage, and the 
Smali files are mainly applied to dynamic monitoring module. First of all, we choose those suspicious applications 
with great potential to leak user's privacy. Then if a program is suspicious, enter into the dynamic monitoring 
module, where input the target Smali codes, embed some tracking code, repackage and re-sign the APK. In future, 
once the APK is running, we can dynamically monitor the behavior of privacy leakage and give immediate alarm for 
users. And those alerts or logs can be used for further detailed analysis manually or automatically. Next, we will 
discuss the three core components of the framework: APK Static Decompiler, Permission Filtering Module and 
Dynamic Monitoring Module. 
 
2.2   APK Static De-compilation 
 
Before permission filtering and dynamic monitoring, we need to extract the Android application's 
AndroidManifest.xml file and smali files equivalent to the target APK. The Android application is an installation 
package ended with suffix.apk (an acronym for Android Package). APK is same as to .exe (executable) file in 
computer, after installed can be executed in Android OS immediately. APK is actually a compressed file compliance 
with the ZIP format, which can be extracted by popular .zip compatible decompression tools. In addition, it must be 
noted that most applications are code-obfuscated, and the unzipped file is not able to analyze directly. It should be 
decompiled to extract its resource, permissions, and the intermediate representation files. In this paper the 
apktool[12]  is used for decompiling. The file structure of .APK file in Android apps after decompilation is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The file structure after APK decompiled 
 
Directory/File Description 
res 
 
Application's resource file, including pictures, sound, video and etc. 
smali 
 
Dalvik register bytecode fies of APK 
AndroidManifest.xml 
 
The global configuration file of APK including the package name, 
permissions, referenced libraries and other related information of the 
application. 
Apktool.yml 
 
The configuration file of Apktool  
 Fig 2.  APK to .Class conversion steps 
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2.3 Permission Module 
There is some permission that may not exist risks by itself, but combination of permissions may exist a security 
risk. For example, an application applies for permissions to read phone state and sending messages, and there 
may exist risk of transfer the phone number or IMEI out. Permissions module is based on a set of security 
policies to find out whether an application has some special risk permission combinations. For all the Android 
permissions, there are four types of security levels. Those are Normal, Dangerous, Signature and 
SignatureOrSystem. 
 
2.4 Dynamic Monitoring Module 
 
We apply real-time monitoring by inserting monitoring code to the decompiled APK. The Android developers 
write the application in Java, compiles it into Java byte code, and finally transfers to the Dalvik byte code which 
can be executed in DVM. So it easy to do reverse engineering  by converting the Dalvik byte code to Java byte 
code, then rewrite the Java byte code, and finally convert the rewritten Java byte code back to Dalvik  byte 
code. Still, this type of method does not work all the time. There are quite a few significant differences between 
Java Virtual Machine and Dalvik Virtual Machine. JVM is based on stack while DVM is based on register. A 
number of tools are available, such as dex2jar [11] and ded [7], which will convert Dalvik byte code to Java 
byte code. Still this is not a lossless converting; some information from the Java byte code is lost when being 
converted to Dalvik. These tools try to gather the lost details based on the context, but at times the inference is 
defective. Even while these errors does  not prevent static analysis on the converted Java byte code, in our 
experience they often lead to invalid Java byte code or later invalid Dalvik bytecode. After we convert an 
application's Dalvik byte code to Java byte code (e.g. dex2jar) and then back to Dalvik bytecode, the resulting 
application does not run properly. So the possible way is to directly use the Dalvik byte code. Smali and 
baksmali are two assembler and disassembler respectively for the dex format used by the DVM. Smali is an 
intermediary depiction of Dalvik byte code. Smali can fully realized all the features of dex format (annotations, 
debug information, thread information, etc.). Moreover, dex and Smali can convert lossless between each other. 
In this paper we try to directly rewrite Dalvik byte code, insert the monitoring Smali bytecode into the 
decompiled Smali files. The process of dynamic monitoring method is shown in Figure 4. In Figure 4, we can 
obtain Smali files from the static decompiling. Then locate the concrete position of the sensitive API, and insert 
monitoring Smali byte code to each dissimilar susceptible API. After that we use apktool to repackage the 
modified Smali byte code to create a new .APK and use the signature tool to re-sign it. Running the new APK 
on Android emulator, we can use logcat to view the runtime logs. It can generate a log on SD card which 
records the detailed call information. 
 
 
Fig 3. Converting .dex to .class of Android app BBCNews.Apk 
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Fig 4. Decoding smali code and AndroidManifest.xml of Android app BBCNews.apk 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper we proposed a two-step analysis of Android apps: static and dynamic. At the initial stage the 
permission related issues of applications are highlighted. The permission mechanism of Android OS provides the 
facility to access all the required details during installation and once accepted the permission can’t be modified. To 
stop this we use two mechanism i.e. static and dynamic methods to analyze the behavior of to find apps are 
malicious or not. We use reverse engineering tools through which the .APK file is converted to .Class file and the 
code is analyzed and changes are made and then it repackaged again using Smali byte code which is an intermediate 
code of APK file. This smali code is inserted into process for monitoring purpose. This method can be used at wide 
scale for monitoring service automatically. Further research will continue for monitoring the sensitive API in 
Android and explore the vulnerability of the apps. At the same time to provide more dynamic analysis methods to 
conduct more research. 
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